➢ Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is a cornerstone of its defense policy, designed to deter India’s conventional and nuclear superiority. Unlike India’s “No First Use” (NFU) policy, Pakistan maintains a policy of ambiguity, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in response to existential threats.

➢ Western Perspective

Western scholars often view Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine as inherently destabilizing due to its first-use posture and reliance on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). George Perkovich (2013) argues that Pakistan’s development of short-range TNWs, such as the Nasr missile, lowers the nuclear threshold, increasing the risk of escalation during crises. He cites the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan

standoff as evidence of how nuclear ambiguity complicates crisis stability (Perkovich, 2013, p. 227).Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon (2015) highlight the organizational risks in Pakistan’s nuclear

command-and-control (C2) system. They note that the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) operates with significant autonomy, raising concerns about pre-delegation of nuclear authority to field

commanders during wartime. This structure, they argue, heightens the risk of miscalculation or unauthorized use (Dalton & Krepon, 2015, p. 19).

➢ Pakistani Perspective

Pakistani scholars defend the first-use doctrine as a necessary deterrent against India’s numerical and technological advantages. Feroz Hassan Khan (2012), a former SPD official, argues that Pakistan’s nuclear posture is a “minimum credible deterrence”

tailored to counter India’s Cold Start doctrine, which envisions rapid conventional incursions. Khan emphasizes that TNWs are defensive tools to neutralize India’s armored thrusts without

escalating to strategic nuclear exchange (Khan, 2012, p. 45). Zafar Iqbal Cheema (2010) contends that Pakistan’s nuclear ambiguity enhances deterrence by keeping India uncertain about redlines.

He cites the Kargil War (1999) and the 2008 Mumbai attacks as instances where nuclear deterrence prevented full-scale war, underscoring the doctrine’s stabilizing effect (Cheema, 2010, p.78).

➢ Critique

Both Western and Pakistani scholars acknowledge the doctrine’s dual-edged nature. While it deters India, the reliance on TNWs and ambiguity risks escalation. Western authors like Perkovich call for

greater transparency in C2, while Pakistani scholars like Khan advocate for confidence-building measures (CBMs) with India, such as hotline agreements, to reduce misperceptions.

➢ Defense Budget Allocation

Pakistan’s defense budget is a critical component of its policy, reflecting priorities and trade-offs between security and development. In 2024–2025, Pakistan allocated approximately PKR 2.12 trillion (USD 7.6 billion) to defense, representing 3.7% of GDP and 20% of the national budget (Malik, 2024).

➢ Western Perspective

Western economists like Michael Kugelman (2023) argue that Pakistan’s defense spending is unsustainable given its economic challenges, including a 2023 debt crisis and IMF bailout

conditions. Kugelman notes that the defense budget’s opacity— lacking detailed breakdowns—fuels public discontent, especially when social services like education (1.7% of GDP) and healthcare

(0.8% of GDP) are underfunded (Kugelman, 2023, p.45).Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2019) critiques the opportunity costs of defense spending, arguing that investments in human security—education, healthcare, and infrastructure—could address root causes of militancy more effectively than military operations (Tadjbakhsh, 2019, p. 67).

➢ Pakistani Perspective

Pakistani economists defend the defense budget as a necessity given the regional threat environment. Kaiser Bengali (2022) argues that India’s defense spending (USD 81 billion in 2023) and military modernization compel Pakistan to maintain a robust budget. He notes that Pakistan’s per capita defense spending is lower than India’s, reflecting efficiency despite resource constraints (Bengali, 2022, p. 23).Afia Malik (2024) acknowledges the economic strain but emphasizes that defense spending supports domestic industries, such as Pakistan Ordnance Factories and Heavy

Industries Taxila, which employ thousands. She advocates for gradual reductions tied to regional de-escalation and economic recovery (Malik, 2024, p. 589).

➢ Critique

The defense budget’s prioritization over social spending remains a flashpoint. Western scholars call for transparency and reallocation, while Pakistani authors stress the need for external security guarantees to enable reductions. Both agree that economic instability could force a reevaluation of budget priorities.

➢ Emerging Challenges

Pakistan’s defense policy must adapt to emerging threats, including cyber warfare and climate-induced security risks, which are underexplored in traditional analyses.

➢ Cyber warfare

Pakistan’s growing reliance on digital infrastructure, including its nuclear C2 systems, exposes it to cyber threats. Western scholar Peter Singer (2021) warns that Pakistan’s cybersecurity capabilities lag behind India’s, citing the 2019 Balakot crisis, where Indian cyberattacks allegedly targeted Pakistani military networks. He argues that Pakistan’s defense policy must prioritize cyber defense to protect critical assets (Singer, 2021, p. 78).Pakistani scholar Usman Shahid (2023) acknowledges the threat, noting that Pakistan’s Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) and National Cyber Security Policy (2021) are steps forward. However, he highlights the need for skilled personnel and international cooperation to counter sophisticated state-sponsored attacks (Shahid, 2023, p. 112).

➢ Climate Security

Climate change poses indirect but significant security risks. Western analyst Saleemul Huq (2022) links Pakistan’s 2022 floods, which displaced 33 million people, to increased resource competition and militancy in vulnerable regions. He argues that defense policy must integrate climate adaptation, such as securing water resources along the Indus River, to prevent conflict (Huq, 2022, p. 45).Pakistani scholar Adil Najam (2023) emphasizes the nexus between climate and security, citing the 2022 floods’ impact on food security and displacement. He calls for a “climate

resilient defense policy” that allocates resources to disaster response and infrastructure protection (Najam, 2023, p. 67). 

➢ Policy Recommendations

Refine Nuclear Doctrine: Adopt limited transparency measures, such as public C2 guidelines, to enhance credibility without compromising ambiguity (Perkovich, 2013; Cheema, 2010).Strengthen Counterterrorism: Dismantle all militant networks and invest in de-radicalization programs, supported by international aid (Tankel, 2016; Yusuf, 2014).Rebalance Budget:

Gradually reduce defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, redirecting funds to education and healthcare, contingent on regional CBMs (Kugelman, 2023; Malik, 2024).Address Emerging Threats: Establish a dedicated cyber defense unit within the SPD and integrate climate risk assessments into defense planning (Singer, 2021; Najam, 2023).

➢ Conclusion

Pakistan’s defense policy is a dynamic response to a complex security environment, balancing nuclear deterrence, counterterrorism, and conventional capabilities. Western scholars highlight risks like nuclear escalation and economic unsustainability, while Pakistani authors emphasize the necessity of a strong defense posture given regional threats. Emerging challenges, such as cyber warfare and climate security, demand a forward-looking approach. By addressing civil-military

imbalances, enhancing transparency, and integrating new threats, Pakistan can develop a more resilient and sustainable defense policy.